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THE SUPREME COURT-OCTOBER 1958 TERM

Bernard Schwartz*

T

Supreme Court, reads a famous passage by Bryce, "feels
the touch of public opinion. Opinion is stronger in America
than anywhere else in the world, and judges are only men. To
yield a little may be prudent, for the tree that cannot bend to the
blast may be broken." 1
The history of the highest Court bears constant witness to the
truth of Bryce's statement. Supreme Court action which has
moved too far in one direction has always ultimately provoked
an equivalent reaction in the opposite direction. Even an institution as august as the high tribunal cannot escape the law of the
pendulum.
The decisions of the Court during the October 1958 term seem
to fit directly into the pattern observed by Bryce. In recent years,
the Court itself has come under increasing criticism because of
decisions which have been seen unduly to limit both congressional
and state powers. During 1959, on the other hand, important decisions were handed down which reaffirmed both congressional investigatory authority and state power in important areas. As has
so often happened, the Court itself appears to have remolded its
jurisprudence so as to render moot much of the criticism against it.
Members of a society dominated by what has been well termed
"government by lawsuit"2 tend all too often to forget the inherently weak position of the judicial department. The basic strength
of the high Court is not its constitutional position, but the acceptance by public opinion of its role as guardian of the Constitution.
Justice Miller has said:
"Dependent as its Courts are for the enforcement of their
judgments upon officers appointed by the executive and removable at his pleasure, with no patronage and no control of
the purse or the sword, their power and influence rest solely
HE

• Professor of Law, New York University.-Ed.
1 l BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, 3d ed., 273 (1908).
2 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 286 (1941).
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upon the public sense of the necessity for the existence of a
tribunal to which all may appeal for the assertion and protection of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and by the laws
of the land, and on the confidence reposed in the soundness
of their decisions and the purity of their motives."3
From this point of view, action by the Court which brings its
decisions into line with the dominant sense of the community can
only be commended. In a representative, democratic government,
as Chief Justice Vanderbilt well pointed out,4 the power of the
judiciary depends largely on its reputation for independence, integrity, and wisdom. The Supreme Court can maintain its role
only so long as it continues to maintain its reputation in these
respects in the public eye.

I.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATORY POWER

Few aspects of legislative authority have received more public
attention in recent years than the power of investigation. At
times, in truth, it has seemed as if the chief role of our Congress
has become that of what William Pitt the Elder once called the
"Grand Inquest of the Nation." 5 Certainly, since the last war at
least, the congressman qua inquisitor has seemed almost to place
the congressman qua legislator in the shade.
"Scarcely any political question arises in the United States,"
acutely observed de Tocqueville over a century ago, "that is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." 6 And so it
was to be expected that the exercise of congressional investigatory
authority, too, would give rise to controversies for adjudication by
the highest Court. Until the present Court, however, the dominant
judicial theme in this field was that of abnegation. "Courts," said
the Vinson Court in 1951, with regard to legislative investigative
abuses, "are not the place for such controversies. Self-discipline
and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or
correcting such abuses." 7
All this appeared to be changed when, two years ago, the Court
handed dmvn its decision in Watkins v. United States.8 In Wat· 3 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 at 223 (1882).
4 VANDERBILT, THE DOCI'RINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY
SIGNIFICANCE 140 (1953).
5 TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 1 (1955).
6 Quoted in American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 415

(1950).
7Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 at 378 (1951).
s 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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kins, for the first time in almost a century,9 the high bench found
that an exercise of congressional investigatory authority exceeded
the permissible limits upon legislative power. With Watkins, it
seemed, the Court had assumed a definite position of overseer
vis-a-vis legislative exertions of investigatory power. According to
some, indeed, Watkins itself was a serious barrier even to legitimate
exercises by the Congress of its inquiring function.10
During the 1958 term, the Court indicated that the actual
effect of Watkins was not nearly as extreme as many had feared.
In this respect, it is important to distinguish between the actual
holding in Watkins and the broad language of the Court's opinion
there. The former constituted a needed check upon legislative
investigations; the latter, if taken literally, could lead to emasculation of the informing function of the Congress.
The bare holding in Watkins was well stated in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion there: "The actual scope of the inquiry that the [congressional] Committee was authorized to conduct and the relevance of the questions to that inquiry must be
shown to have been luminous at the time when asked." 11 The
"contempt of Congress" conviction at issue in Watkins was reversed because it had not been shown to the witness that the questions he had refused to answer were clearly pertinent to an authorized inquiry of the investigating committee. As the Court put it,
"knowledge of the subject to which the_ interrogation is deemed
pertinent ... must be available with the same degree of explicitness and clarity that the Due Process Clause requires in the expression of any element of a criminal offense. " 12
The Watkins test of pertinency was the basis for the Court's
decision in Scull v. Virginia. 13 Defendant there was convicted of
contempt in a Virginia court for refusing to obey a court order to
answer certain questions put to him by an investigating committee
of the Virginia legislature. The committee in question had been set
up after the Supreme Court's desegregation decision and appeared
to be aimed at organizations and individuals attempting to secure
integration in Virginia schools. The resolution setting up the committee specified that it could inquire into three general subjects:
(I) the tax status of racial organizations and of contributions to
See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
lOSee Schwartz, "The Supreme Court-October 1956 Term," 32 N.Y.
1202 at 1215 (1957).
11354 U.S. 178 at 217 (1957).
12 Id. at 208-209.
1a 359 U.S. 344 (1959).
9

UNIV.

L. REv.
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them; (2) the effect of integration or its threat on the public schools
of Virginia and on the general welfare of the state; and (3) the
violation of the laws against champerty, barratry~ and maintenance
or the unauthorized practice of law.14 Defendant was asked thirtyone specific questions, but it was not shown how any of them was
pertinent to these subjects. In reversing defendant's conviction,
the Court held that this violated the Wat kins pertinency test.1 5
Defendant, said the court, did not in these circumstances, "have
an opportunity of understanding the basis for the questions or
any justification on the part of the Committee for seeking the information he refused to give."16
One familiar with the workings of legislative committees and
their all-too-common tendency to stray beyond the bounds of their
authorizing resolutions cannot but agree with the Wat kins-Scull
approach. A reading of the questions asked in Scull is bound to
make one wonder how most of them had any relationship at all
to the subjects the committee was authorized to investigate.17
Under Watkins, investigative power must at least be canalized within the bounds of pertinency - a limitation that imposes a needed
check upon legislators who all too often interpret their investigative mandates as roving commissions to inquire into anything
which appears suited to propel themselves into the headlines.
As already indicated, however, the test of pertinency was but
a small part of the Wat kins opinion. Instead of limiting himself
to articulation of that test, the Chief Justice, who delivered the
Wat kin$ opinion, used the occasion to write a broad essay on congressional investigatory authority in which he went far beyond
the bare holding of the case.
This is what makes the decision last term in Barenblatt v.
United States18 so significant. Barenblatt indicates that the Chief
Justice's dicta in Watkins were just that-merely obiter. As such,
they have only the effect enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in
14 Id. at 347.
15 Watkins itself

is binding on the states because it lays down a rule of "fundamental
fairness." Id. at 353.
16 lbid.
11 E.g., "Question 28 asked if the Communist Party used Box 218; Question 30 asked
if Scull had ever been called as a witness before a Congressional Committee; Question 31
asked if his name had ever been cited by any Congressional Committee as being on any
list of members of any organizations that are cited as subversive. Nothing in the language
of the Act authorizing the Committee or in the statement of Chairman Thomson about
the subjects under inquiry could lead Scull to think that it was the Committee's duty to
investigate Communist or subversive activities." Id. at 350, n. 5.
1s 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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his famous statement in Cohens v. Virginia19 -i.e., general language
which goes beyond the actual ratio ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit.
Barenblatt, like Watkins, involved a conviction for contempt
of Congress arising from petitioner's refusal to answer certain
questions put to him by a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Un-American Activities. In this case, however, the Court felt
that the pertinency of the questions asked was clearly established.20
This brought the Court directly to the broader issues of the scope
of congressional investigatory power with which Wat kins had
gratuitously dealt.
The Chief Justice's language in Watkins had cast doubt upon
the validity of authorizing resolutions containing broad investigatory mandates, such as that setting up the Un-American Activities
Committee itself. Speaking of the charter of that committee,21 the
Chief Justice had declared, "It would be difficult to imagine a less
explicit authorizing resolution. Who can define the meaning of
'un-American'?" 22 Implicit in this was the view that the enabling
resolution of the House committee was too vague to be valid.
The difficulty with this view is that it loses sight of the practical realities of the legislative process. The exigencies of the congressional calendar make it impossible for the mandates of committees to be laid down in other than broad terms. There is certainly as much justification for broad standards here as there is
in the delegation of powers to administrative agencies. 23 The
Wat kins approach might invalidate the charters of most congressional committees, since, as Justice Clark pointed out in his
Wat kins dissent, the common practice is for such committees to
be given power "in exceedingly broad terms." 24 In addition, it is
hard to see, under the Chief Justice's Watkins language, how a
body like the Un-American Activities Committee could be given a
valid charter. Its area of investigation must, of necessity, be de10 6

Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 at 399 (1821).
20 Even the dissenting members of the Court did not seem to question this.
21 According to its enabling resolution, "The Committee on Un-American Activities,
as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of
(1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United
States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the
principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other
questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation."
360 U.S. 109 at 116, n. 6 (1959).
22 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 202 (1957).
23 See SCHWARTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 37 (1958).
24 354 U.S. 178 at 220 (1957).

170

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

fined through terms such as "un-American." If such a term cannot be defined with mathematical precision, it does nonetheless, in
its broad contours, cover sufficiently a field which clearly comes
within the· legitimate concern of the Congress.
In Barenblatt, petitioner relied on Watkins as holding that
the resolution authorizing the Un-American Activities Committee
was invalid because of its vagueness in delineating the committee's
jurisdiction. The majority of the Court rejected this argument.
"We cannot agree with this contention," declared Justice Harlan,
"which in its furthest reach would mean that the House-UnAmerican Activities Committee under its existing authority has no
right to compel testimony in any circumstances."25 The holding
here is more consistent with legislative reality than the broad
Watkins language. Whatever one may think of the manner in
which the role of the Un-American Activities Committee has at
times been exercised, that surely does not bear upon the congressional power to constitute such a committee.
The Watkins opinion did not limit itself to casting doubt upon
the validity of the Un-American Activities Committee. Instead· it
placed much of recent congressional investigating activity under a
constitutional shadow. "We have no doubt," reads the most frequently quoted passage of the Wat kins opinion, "that there is no
congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure."26
Petitioner in Barenblatt placed perhaps his principal reliance
on this Watkins language, urging that the investigation at issue
should not be deemed to have been in furtherance of a legislative
purpose because the true objective of the committee was purely
"exposure." The four dissenting justices27 agreed with this contention. The majority, however, rejected it, in terms which indicate that the Watkins dictum on "exposure for exposure's sake"
itself is hardly to be taken as a controlling rule of law.
In Wat kins, the Chief Justice went out of his way to stress
restrictions upon legislative investigatory authority. In Barenblatt,
the focus has completely shifted. At the very start of his opinion,
Justice Harlan sets the theme by emphasizing, not the limitations,
but the extent of the congressional power. "The scope of the power
of inquiry, in short," he affirms, "is as penetrating and far-reaching
as the potential power to _enact and appropriate under the Constitution. " 28
25 360 U.S. 109 at 117 (1959).
26 354 U.S. 178 at 200 (1957).
27 Black, J., Warren, C.J., Douglas,
28 360 U.S. 109 at Ill (1959).

J., and Brennan, J., dissented.
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Under Justice Harlan's approach, the key question for the
Court to answer is whether the particular investigation was related
to a valid legislative purpose. In Barenblatt, such relationship was
said to be clearly established: "That Congress has wide power to
legislate in the field of Communist activity in this Country, and to
conduct appropriate investigations in aid thereof, is hardly debatable."29
That being the case, it is irrelevant that petitioner claims that
the true objective of the committee was "exposure" rather than
the furtherance of a legislative purpose. "So long," states the
Barenblatt opinion, "as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the
basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that power."30
If a congressional investigation, in other words, is related to a
valid legislative purpose, it cannot be invalidated because the
Court feels that its real purpose is the exposure of those being
investigated.
Barenblatt represents a needed corrective to the extreme implications of the Wat kins opinion. Under it, the "power of inquiry [may be] employed by Congress ... over the whole range of
the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or
decide upon due investigation not to legislate; it [may] similarly
[be] utilized in determining what to appropriate from the national
purse, or whether to appropriate."31
Congressional investigatory authority is thus as broad as the
legislative power itself. It encompasses both the sword and the
purse and may be utilized in any area in which congressional
power itself may be exerted. And, under Barenblatt, a court cannot go behind such valid legislative purpose to determine that the
true motive of the congressmen was only "exposure."
It may be objected that such an approach will require the
courts to uphold all but the most extravagant assertions of legislative investigatory authority. Particularly, it will be said, this will
leave the citizen helpless before possible abuses of congressional
investigatory power such as those that have occurred all too frequently in recent years.
The danger of misuse is not, all the same, a ground for denying the existence and scope of a power. Certainly investigatory
authority may be abused; the same is also true of the law-making
29 Id. at 127.
so Id. at 132.
31 Id. at Ill.
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power of the Congress and, indeed, of all governmental power.32
But the possibility of abuse does not justify the courts in setting
themselves up as the censors of what is, after all, the internal functioning of a co-ordinate branch of government. The elected representatives of the people, more directly responsible to the citizenry than any other organ of government, should not be too
closely restricted by the. courts in their efforts to bring to light
anything that they feel should be subjected to public scrutiny.
It would, in the words of Justice Jackson in a 1949 case, "be an
unwarranted act of judicial usurpation . . . to assume for the
courts the function of supervising congressional committees. I
should ... leave the responsibility for the behavior of its committees squarely on the shoulders of Congress." 33

II.

LOYALTY-SECURITY CASES

Among the most difficult problems presented to the Supreme
Court during the past decade has been that of dealing with the
government's response to the "cold war" that has become so prominent a feature of the post-war world. In terms of quantitative impact upon the individual, perhaps the most important governmental measures taken in this area have been the institution of
various loyalty and security programs. In 1956, the federal loyalty-security program covered nearly six million civilian employees
in both government and private industry.34 And, even after the
scope of the program was narrowed that year by the Court's decision in Cole v. Young, 35 several million persons continued to be
covered by it.36
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on the
matter, there can be little doubt about the substantive authority of
the government to dismiss or refuse to hire employees who are disloyal or constitute security risks. 37 But, if the governmental power
to bar the disloyal from its service has not really been open to question, the same has not been true of the means used to implement
the government's conceded authority in this connection. And this
has been particularly true of the procedural aspects of the federal
loyalty-security program.
32 See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 175 (1927).
33 Dissenting, in Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 at 196 (1949).
34 See SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT 323 (1957).
35 351 U.S. 535 (1956).
36 See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 at 507, n. 31 (1959).
37 Gamer v. Lqs Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), and Adler v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 485 (1952), are clearly based upon such authority.
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It can hardly be denied that loyalty-security proceedings have
not been carried on in accordance with all of the procedural safeguards that are deemed necessary in other fields of our law. The
right of cross-examination can serve to illustrate this point. Every
party to an administrative proceeding, reads the relevant section of
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, "shall have the right
... to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a
full and true disclosure of the facts. 38 In loyalty-security cases, however, the government has felt that to allow those charged with
disloyalty to confront and cross-examine those who have given the
Federal Bureau of Investigation the information upon which the
charge is based would impair the investigative network which the
FBI has built up. From the FBI's point of view, it is hardly worthwhile to destroy the usefulness of its undercover operatives by
disclosing their identity. That game, the Bureau would say, is
plainly not worth the candle.39
At the same time, the failure to accord the rights of confrontation and cross-examination has tended all too often to make the
hearings accorded in loyalty cases a matter of empty form. This can
be seen clearly from a case like Greene v. McElroy. 40 Petitioner
there had had his security clearance revoked after a hearing before
the relevant board on charges of Communist associations. The
essence of this "hearing" has been described by Chief Justice
Warren:
"The Government presented no witnesses. It was obvious,
however, from the questions posed to petitioner and to his
witnesses, that the Board relied on confidential reports which
were never made available to petitioner. These reports
apparently were compilations of statements taken from various
persons contacted by an investigatory agency. Petitioner had
no opportunity to confront and question persons whose statements reflected adversely on him or to confront the government investigators who took their statements."41
In a case like this, the situation confronting petitioner was
almost an impossible one. Where an individual does not know the
identity of his accusers and cannot confront or cross-examine them,
his task in refuting their charges becomes well-nigh insuperable.
In such a case, in the Chief Justice's words, "not only is the testi3860 StaL 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1958) §1006(c).
39 Compare BARTH, THE LoYALTY OF FREE MEN 133 (1951).
40 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
41 Id. at 479.

174

MICHIGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

mony of absent witnesses allowed to stand without the probing
questions of the person under attack which often uncover inconsistencies, lapses of recollection, and bias, but, in addition, even the
members of the clearance boards do not see the informants or
know their identities, but normally rely on an investigator's summary report of what the informant said without even examining
the investigator personally."42
How, it may be asked, can condemnation by "faceless informers"48 of the type involved in the Greene case be reconciled with
the requirements of due process?
It must be stated, in all frankness, that the Supreme Court has
never given a satisfactory answer to this question. In fact, the
Court has most carefully avoided having to give a reasoned reply
to it. During the past term, too, the Court was able to reach
decisions in this field without having to resolve the basic constitutional issues involved. In Vitarelli v. Seaton,44 the Court invalidated the dismissal of a Department of Interior employee,
on the ground that the procedure followed had violated the department's own regulations governing such cases. And, in the Greene
case, the revocation of petitioner's security clearance (which had
caused his discharge from employment with a government contractor) was declared void because the relevant agency had not
been expressly authorized by either the President or the Congress
to act in such cases without affording those affected the safeguards
of confrontation and cross-examination. By so holding, the Court
again avoided tlie constitutional issue.45
But the basic constitutional question still remains: can an individual be deprived of the fundamentals of fair play because the
government finds that his case presents security problems? "Perhaps the most delicate, difficult and shifting of all balances which
the Court is expected to maintain," ·wrote Justice Jackson just
before his death five years ago, "is that between liberty and
authority."46 Keeping the balance is especially difficult in a time
.of tension, when legitimate demands of security must be heard.
42 Id. at 497-499.
48The term used by Douglas, J., concurring, in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 at 350
(1955).
44 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
45 "Before we are asked to judge whether, in the context of security clearance cases,
a person may be deprived of the right to follow his chosen profession without full hearings
where accusers may be confronted, it must be made clear that the President or Congress,
within their constitutional powers, specifically has decided that the imposed procedures
are necessary and warranted and has authorized their use." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474 at 507 (1959).
-!6 JACKSON, THE SUPREME CoURT IN THE .AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GoVERNMENT 75. (1955).
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At the same time, governmental action must be fitted into the mold
of due process, even during a "cold war." Even then, the values
inherent in the constitutional demand should make us hesitate
before construing the law so as to deny adjective justice.
In the loyalty-security cases, fair resolution of the procedural
problem has been clouded by the aphorism that no one has a
"right" to be a civil servant. Public employment is thus only a
"privilege;" its possessor is not protected by constitutional procedural requirements. "Due process of law," in the phrase of a
federal court, "is not applicable unless one is being deprived of
something to which he has a right."47
To deny the rudiments of adjective justice to the civil servant
because public employment is only a privilege is to employ the
kind of legal reasoning that has all the beauty of abstract logic and
all the ugliness of injustice.48 To describe public employment as
a "privilege" is really only a convenient way of avoiding the problem of due process. It does not at all follow that, because the law
does not guarantee to anyone a right to public employment, the
government can resort to any scheme for depriving people of their
positions in the civil service. "The fact that one may not have a
legal right to get or keep a government post does not mean that
he can be judged ineligible illegally.''49
Denial of basic adjective requirements has an even less substantial legal foundation in a case like Greene, where public employment was not involved. The governmental issue at action
there affected petitioner in a clear pre-existing "right" - namely,
that of private employment: "the right to hold specific private
employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and
'property' concepts of the Fifth Amendment.''50
If there is one principle that is established in our public law,
it is that which prohibits a governmental agency from adversely
affecting an individual in his personal or property rights without
complying with the requirements of procedural due process, including the fundamental rights of confrontation and cross-examination. Perhaps the most important portion of the Greene opinion is
the following passage, in which this basic principle is reaffirmed:
47 Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46 at 58, affd. by equally divided
Court 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
'
48 Compare Mitchell, "The Anatomy and Pathology of the Constitution," 67 JURID.
REv. 1 (1955).
49 Jackson, J., concurring, in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 at 185 (1951).
GO 360 U.S. 474 at 492 (1959).
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"Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in
our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental
action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness
of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to
prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
While this is important in the case of documentary evidence,
it is even more important where the evidence consists of the
testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or
who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by
malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We
have formalized these protections in the requirements of
confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient
roots."lil
It is recognized that this language was not necessary to the
Greene decision. Strictly speaking, therefore, it was delivered only
by way of obiter. Yet it remains the only indication by the Court
of its view on the constitutional issue involved in a case like Greene.
And it points to ultimate resolution of that issue in favor of the
procedural rights of the individual. In such a case, according to the
Greene opinion, "We deal . . . with substantial restraints on employment opportunities of numerous persons imposed in a manner
which is· in conflict with our long-accepted notions of fair procedures.''62 The plain implication here is that, at least where
public employment is not involved, the individual cannot be
deprived of his job by governmental action except after a hearing
which comports with our traditional ideas of fair procedure53 including the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination,li 4

IJI.

SUBVERSION AND THE STATES

The decisions rendered during the past term point up the role
of the high Court as the ultimate arbiter of the federal system.
Few, if any, functions of that tribunal are of greater practical
importance. It is the supreme bench which ensures that national
authority is not frustrated by a "crazy quilt"66 of conflicting local
laws. And, at the same time, it is that body which guarantees that
the states will not ultimately be swallowed up by the government
lil Id.

at 496.
506-507.
IISibid.
54 Id. at 507.
112 Id. at

115 The

term used by Frankfurter,

at 388 (1946).

J.,

concurring, in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373
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in Washington. It is, in truth, difficult to conceive how a federal
system like ours could work in practice without a judicial umpire.
As Chief Justice Taney aptly stated a century ago, "So long . . .
as this Constitution shall endure, this tribunal must exist with it,
deciding in the peaceful forms of judicial proceedings the angry
and irritating controversies between sovereignties, which in other
countries have been determined by the arbitrament of force.'' 116
Among the most sharply criticized decisions of the high Court
in recent years have been those invalidating state laws on the
ground of conflict (express or, more commonly, implied) between
them and federal legislation. To critics, these have been seen as
judicial attempts to reduce the states to governmental sterility.
Indeed, its decisions restricting state authority have been more
instrumental than any others (aside from those in the field of
racial discrimination) in leading to serious congressional attempts
to curb the Court.
But, as so often happens in our system, the justices themselves
appear to have come to realize that they had gone too far in their
jurisprudence in this field. In this writer's analysis of the 1957
term, it was noted that the Court was indicating a readiness to
uphold state power in situations where a contrary result might
previously have been reached.117 The tendency in this direction
continued during the 1958 term. In the fields of subversion and
taxation of interstate commerce, state authority was recognized in
a manner which (whether or not the Court consciously intended
that result) is bound to remove much of the ammunition from
critics of the high tribunal in this area.
In its 1956 decision in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 68 the Court
invalidated the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, on the ground that it
was superseded by the Federal Smith Act, which proscribed the
same conduct. The Nelson opinion declared that "Congress has intended to occupy the field of sedition." 159 Critics of the Court not
unnaturally assumed that this meant just what it said and left the
states without any authority to deal with sedition. Some went so
far as to paint a picture of the states, helpless in the face of Communist conspiracy - shorn of all power to cope with subversion
against themselves.
156 Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. (62 U.S.) 506 at 521 (1859).
157 Schwartz, "The Supreme Court-October 1957 Term," 57 MICH.

(1959).
ISS 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
IS9 Id. at 504.

L. REv. 315 at 332
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Whether or not that picture was ever accurate,60 it is plain that
Uphaus v. Wyman 61 makes it a distortion of reality. Uphaus arose
out of an investigation undertaken under a resolution of the state
legislature diretting an investigation of violations of the New
Hampshire Subversive Activities Act. Appellant had been found
guilty of contempt for refusal to produce certain documents before
the legislative investigating committee. 62 He contended that the
Nelson decision barred all state action in the field of subversion,
including legislative investigations. According to the Court, however, "The appellant's argument sweeps too broad." 63
As explained by Justice Clark in Uphaus, Nelson did not
eliminate all state action in the field of subversion. Nelson, says
the Uphaus opinion, "rejects the notion that it stripped the States of
the right to protect themselves." 64 What then is left for the states
under Uphaus? Justice Clark mentioned the following: prosecutions for sedition against the state itself; state activity in protection
of itself either from actual or threatened sabotage or attempted
violence of all kinds; and internal civil disturbances. "Thus registration statutes, quo warranto proceedings as to subversive corporations, the subversive instigation of riots and a host of other subjects
directly affecting state security furnish grist for the State's legislative mill." 65
The Uphaus gloss on Nelson appears to be based upon a distinction between subversion against the United States and subversion against a state. The Smith Act prohibits knowing advocacy
of the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force
and violence. 66 Nelson, says Uphaus, proscribed only state enforcement of laws aimed at such subversion. It did not affect state
authority to enforce laws barring such advocacy against a state's
own government. It should, however, be pointed out that, valid
though the distinction made by the Court in this respect may be
as a matter of abstract logic, it has little practical reality. One
engaged in subversive advocacy does not normally act according to
the niceties of theoretical federalism. His advocacy is aimed at
government, without regard to the nuances between federal and
state power. Under Uphaus, all such subversion can be reached
at 500.
(1959).
the relevant resolution, the state attorney general was constituted a oneman legislative investigating committee.
63 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 at 76 (1959).
64Ibid.
65 Id. at 77.
66 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 at 499 (1956).
60 See id.
61 360 U
62 Under

.s. 72
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by the states - as it can be by the federal authorities under the
Smith Act. Such result may be valid for a tribunal which is coming
once again to scrutinize state authority with anything but a hostile
eye. But it should be recognized that it is clearly inconsistent with
the Nelson holding that Congress intended to occupy the field of
sedition. Where Congress does occupy a field of regulation, it has
spoken so as to silence the states - i.e., has acted so as to bar any
state action at all ~n the particular field.
IV.

COMMERCE AND STATE POWER

Even more significant than Uphaus in upholding state power
are last term's decisions involving state taxation of interstate and
foreign commerce. Two of these decisions, in fact, bid fair to become landmark cases, for they make for notable departures in the
law in this area.
The first of the decisions referred to is Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota. 61 It involved the constitutionality of state net income tax laws levying taxes on that portion
of a foreign corporation's net income earned from and fairly apportioned to business activities within the taxing state when those
activities are exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce.
The taxes in question were imposed under laws of Minnesota and
Georgia. The Minnesota tax can serve as our illustration for purposes of discussing the case. It was levied under a statute which
imposes an annual tax upon the taxable net income of residents
and nonresidents alike. One of four classes taxed by the statute
is that of "domestic and foreign corporations ... whose business
within this state during the taxable year consists exclusively of
foreign commerce, inter-state commerce, or both." Minnesota
utilized three ratios in determining the portion of net income taxable under its law. The first was that of the taxpayer's sales assignable to Minnesota during the year to its total sales during that
period made everywhere; the second, that of the taxpayer's total
tangible property in Minnesota for the year to its total tangible
property used in the business that year wherever situated. The
third was the taxpayer's total payroll in Minnesota for the year
to its total payroll for its entire business in the like period. In the
67 358 U.S. 450 (1958). Since this decision, Congress has enacted the Interstate Commerce Tax Act, P. L. 86-272, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (Sept. 14, 1959), barring the states from
imposing net income taxes on income derived in the state from interstate commerce if
the only business activities in the state are solicitation of orders to be approved and filled
outside the state•.
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instant case appellant took no issue with the fairness of this formula
nor of the accuracy of its application. Appellant itself was an Iowa
corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of cement, locally
in Iowa and, in interstate commerce, to dealers in neighboring
states including Minnesota.
,
The Court upheld the Minnesota tax upon the net income of
appellant. According to its decision, "a net income tax on revenues
derived from interstate commerce does not offend constitutional
limitations upon state interference with such commerce." 68 Nor
does it make any difference that the commerce engaged in by
appellant in Minnesota is purely interstate and that, in consequence, the tax was on income derived exclusively from interstate commerce. The tax in question was part of a general scheme
of state taxation, reaching all individual and corporate net income.
The taxing statute was not, as Justice Harlan in his concurring
opinion put it, sought to be applied to portions of the net income
of appellant because of the source of that income-interstate co~merce-but rather despite that source.69 In the Court's view, it
is not an improper interference with interstate commerce to permit
a state within whose borders a foreign corporation engages in
activities in aid of that commerce to tax the net income derived
therefrom on a properly apportioned basis.
The opinion of the Court is based upon ostensible rigid adherence to stare ·decisis. It repeatedly asserts that it is only adhering to principles laid down in prior decisions and disclaims any
intent to break new constitutional ground. But, in actuality, the
Court's holding is novel doctrine. 70 According to Justice Whittaker, who dissented, "Neither the Court nor counsel have cited,
and our research has not disclosed, a single opinion by this Court
that has upheld a state tax laid on 'exclusively interstate commerce,'
and we are confident none exists."71 This statement appears to be
borne out by analysis of the prior cases. Though many cases sustain state taxes imposed upon companies engaged in commerce,
in none of them was the tax exacted from a business whose revenue derived solely from •interstate commerce.
This is not to say that there is not much to commend the
Court's recognition of such state power to tax even interstate
commerce. The constitutional barrier against state taxation in
as 358 U.S. 450 at 458-459 (1958).
69 Id. at 469.
70 The characterization used in Justice Whittaker's dissenting Qpinion. Id. at 484.
71Id. at 487. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter, id. at 470•471.

1959]

THE SUPREME

CouRT-1958

181

TERM

this field was primarily intended to prevent interstate commerce
being placed at a disadvantage. The policy behind the commerce
clause was aimed at what Justice Jackson aptly termed a collection of parasitic states preying upon each other's commerce.72
But this hardly requires that interstate commerce be placed in a
favored position. It, too, should share the burdens and costs of government and should not secure competitive advantage from tax
immunity denied to local commerce. To put it another way, what
the commerce clause requires is an equalization in the tax situation as between interstate and local commerce. The goal, in Professor Freund's phrase, is to prevent an interstate transaction from
being saddled with an aggregate tax burden higher than it would
bear if it had taken place in the same volume and over the same
distance within a single one of the pertinent states.73 At the same
time, the commerce clause hardly requires that the tax burden
be lower simply because state lines were crossed.
In the instant case, equality is the theme of the tax at issue.74
"The thrust of these statutes is not hostile discrimination against
interstate commerce, but rather a seeking of some compensation
for facilities and benefits afforded by the taxing States to incomeproducing activities therein, whether those activities be altogether
local or in furtherance of interstate commerce." 75 Income derived
from sales in a state should not receive immunity from taxation
simply because they are interstate, when such immunity is denied
to similar local sales. Nor, according to the Court, is there any real
danger of a multiple burden resulting from the exactions in question. "The apportioned tax is designed ... 'to prevent the levying of such taxes as will discriminate against or prohibit the
interstate activities or will place the interstate commerce at a disadvantage relative to local commerce.' " 76
The second important case on state taxing power decided last
term is Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Bowers.77 Appellant
in that case operates an industrial plant in Ohio, where it manufactures iron and steel. In addition to the use of domestic ores,
it imports iron ores from five countries. The imported ores arrive
72 JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN TIIE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
73 FREUND, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME I.Aw, Cahn ed., 102 (1954).

J.,

74 See Cardozo,
in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 at 583
711 Harlan,
concurring at 358 U.S. 450 at.469 (1959).
76 Id. at 462. The Court concedes, however, that "In practical operation,

J.,

67 (1955).

(1937).

. . . apportionment formulas being what they are, the possibility of the contrary is not foreclosed,
especially by levies fa domiciliary States." Ibid.
77 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
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in shiploads in bulk at a port of entry where they are unloaded
from the ship into railroad cars and transported to appellant's
plant. The plant is enclosed by a wire fence. Within the enclosure
and adjacent to the manufacturing facilities are several ore yards
for the storage of supplies of ore. When the imported ores arrive
at this final destination, they are unloaded into one of the ore
yards, but, because the ore from each country is different from
the others and each is imported for a different use, the ores from
each country are placed in separate piles in separate areas of the
ore yard. The daily manufacturing needs for ore are taken from
these piles. As ore from a particular "pile" in the ore yard is thus
taken and consumed, other like ore is similarly imported from the
same country and is brought to the plant and unloaded on top
of the remainder of that particular pile. This course is continuously repeated.
The Tax Commissioner of Ohio assessed an ad valorem tax
against appellant based on the value of the iron ores in its ore
yards, including the imported ores remaining in its storage piles.
Appellant contended that the imported ores had not lost their
character as imports and were therefore immune from state taxation.
As stated by Justice Whittaker, who delivered the Youngstown
opinion, the question presented on- the above facts "is whether
appellant[s] ... have so acted upon the materials which they have
imported for use in their manufacturing operations as to cause
them to lose their distinctive character as 'imports,' within the
meaning of that term as used in the Import-Export Clause, Art. I,
§IO, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution."78 The state court
held that appellant had done so. The majority of the Supreme
Court agreed, basing their decision upon the view that imported
goods lose their character as imports as soon as they are used for the
purpose for which they were imported-in this case, use in manufacture.
As in the already-discussed Northwestern States Cement case,
the Court's opinion disowns the notion that it is doing more than
following precedent. The analysis in Justice Frankfurter's dissent, however, demonstrates convincingly tha_t Youngstown does,
in fact, make new law. In particular, the Court's decision appears
directly contrary to Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt,79 where the
fact pattern precisely paralleled that presented here. Despite the
78 Id. at 536.
79 324 U.S. 652

(1945).
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Court's express disclaimer of acting other than in accordance with
that case, the holding and approach of the Youngstown opinion
are remarkably similar to those urged by Justice Black, dissenting,
in Hooven and Allison.80 The Court's approach is also contrary
to the landmark opinion in Brown v. Maryland. 81 According to
John Marshall's famous formula there, "while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty
on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution." 82 This
formula seems clearly applicable to Youngstown, for the goods in
question there remained in the hands of the importer in the form
and shape in which they were brought into the country83 -they
clearly "had not been processed, changed from their original form
or shape, acted upon, physically altered in the slightest, mingled
with domestic goods, or 'used' in the sense that anything was done
to them. " 84
But, if the reasoning in Youngstown is thus open to criticism,
the same is not necessarily true of the decision there. There is
much to be said for the extension of state power which the Court
permits. What the Court really did in Youngstown was to draw a
distinction for purposes of the import-export clause between goods
imported for "sale" and goods imported for "use." Only the former
are to be protected by the "original package" doctrine-i.e., they
are exempt from state taxation while retained by the importer
in their original "form or package"85 prior to their sale. The latter are not to share the same immunity. When they are used by
the importer for the purpose for which they were imported, their
tax exemption is at an end, even though they are still in their original package or form.
The considerations which support the holding that net income
derived from interstate commerce in a state is subject to its taxing
power apply with equal force to the Youngstown decision. The
constitutional ban against state taxation of imports was intended
to prevent "'[t]he great importing States [from laying] a tax on
the non-importing States,' to which the imported property is or
might ultimately be destined, which would not only discriminate
against them but also 'would necessarily produce countervailing
so Id. at 686.
8112 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 419 (1827).
s2 Id. at 442.
83 See Taney, C.J., in The License Cases, 5 How. (46 U.S.) 504 at 575 (1847).
84 358 U.S. 534 at 569-570 (1959).
85 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 419 at 442 (1827).
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measures on the part of those States whose situation, was less favourable to importation.' " 86 But it hardly requires discrimination in
favor of goods imported from other countries. It is true that there
are indications that the qualification against only discriminatory
state taxes in commerce-clause jurisprudence cannot be read into
the import-export clause.87 There is much to be said, however, for
an approach like that in Youngstown which assimilates the two
clauses in this respect. Under it, the Constitution does not require
that foreign products purchased for use of the importer be given
what amounts to a tax subsidy at the expense of the particular state
affected.88 In such a case, the foreign products should be "subject to taxation just like domestic property that was kept at the
same place in the same way for the same use. We cannot impute
to the Framers of the Constitution a purpose to make such a discrimination in favor of materials imported from other countries
as would result if we approved the views pressed upon us by the
manufacturers. " 89
Closely related to the cases involving state taxation of commerce are those dealing with state regulation of commerce. Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines9° is such a case. The Court there was asked
to hold that an Illinois statute requiring the use of a certain type
of rear fender mudguard on trucks and trailers operated on the
highways of that state conflicts with the commerce clause of the
Constitution. The statute provides that the guard shall contour the rear wheel; it must be wide enough to cover the width
of the protected tire, and must have a lip or flange on its outer
edge of not less than two inches. Appellees, interstate motor carriers holding certificates from the Interstate Commerce Commission, challenged the constitutionality of the Illinois statute. A
three-judge district court concluded that it unduly and unreasonably burdened and obstructed interst;;ite commerce, because it
made the conventional or straight mudflap, which is legal in at
least forty-five states, illegal in Illinois, and because the statute,
taken together with a rule of the Arkansas Commerce Commission
requiring straight mudflaps, rendered the use of the same motor
vehicle equipment in both states impossible. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding unanimously that the challenged statute violated
the commerce clause.
86 358

U.S. 534 at 545 (1959) (quoting from Brown v. Maryland).

87 See Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 at 75-76
88 Black,
dissenting, in Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 at 690
89 358 U.S. 534 at 549-550 (1959).

J.,

00 359 U.S. 520 (1959).

(1946).
(1945).
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The Court emphasized the findings below that installation
of the contour mudguards imposed a substantial financial burden
on truckers01 and that such mudguard possessed no advantages in
terms of safety over the conventional straight flap permitted in
almost all states. But this was not the real basis of its decision.
The vice of the challenged statute is to be found in the unconstitutional burden it imposes on the movement of interstate commerce. Such burden arises from the prescription by one state of
standards for interstate commerce which conflict with the standards of another state, "making it necessary, say, for an interstate
carrier to shift its cargo to differently designed vehicles once another state line was reached." 92 This was clearly true under the
rule of the Arkansas commission already mentioned which requires
straight mudflaps. To permit Illinois to enforce her law, while
mudguards remain unregulated or are regulated by varying standards in other states, must inevitably result in an impairment of
uniformity of interstate transportation, because truckers are subjected to regulation which is not uniform in its application. Hence
the Court's holding that the statute in question results in a "rather
massive . . . burden on interstate commerce." 93
Looked at in this way, Bibb represents only a modern application of the fundamental principles laid down over a century
ago in Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens. 94 Here, too, to paraphrase the oft-quoted language of Justice Curtis there, the subject of regulation requires a uniform system, or plan of regulation;
it is not best provided for by as many systems of regulation as the
legislative discretion of the several states should deem applicable.05
The Bibb opinion relies in large part upon Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona,96 where a state statute prescribing a maximum length of
seventy cars for freight trains moving through the state was invalidated on grounds exactly like those stated in Bibb itself.97
It certainly appears logical for the Court to apply the same
rules to state regulation of interstate trucks as to state regulation
of interstate railroads. As the Bibb opinion puts it, "The various
91 The district court found that the initial cost of controlling the mudguards on all
the trucks owned by appellees ranged from $4,500 to $45,840. Id. at 525.
92 Id. at 526.
93 Id. at 528.
94 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851).
95 Id. at 319.
96 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
97 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), which the Court says is even "more closely
in point," 359 U.S. 520 at 526 (1959), does not seem as relevant, since it did not involve
any safety regulation at all.
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exercises by the States of their police power stand ... on an equal
footing." 98 The only difficulty arises from the fact that prior decisions seem to make a clear distinction between regulation of
trucks and railroads in this respect. Thus, in the Southern Pacific
case, the Court had felt compelled to distinguish South Carolina
Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.,99 which had upheld a state
statute prescribing maximum widths and weights for trucks on the
state's roads. Although this law was basically similar to that declared
invalid in Southern Pacific (and, it may be noted, to that in Bibb),
the Court in Southern Pacific explained the seeming inconsistency
by emphasizing the difference between motor and rail transportation: "Unlike the railroads local highways are built, owned and
maintained by the state. . . . The state is responsible for their
safe and economical administration."100 In the field of motor
vehicle regulation, in other words, an added element is present
which tips the scales in favor of state regulatory power-namely,
that motor vehicles use highways furnished and maintained by
the state. Since the South Carolina case, the distinction thus
drawn has been used to uphold many state laws regulating motor
vehicles, even though their prescriptions applied to interstate as
well as purely local traffic.101
The Court in Bibb all but ignores the South Carolina case,
saying that the language in it contrary to its decision cannot
be read in isolation from such later decisions as Southern Pacific.102
But, as already pointed out, the Southern Pacific opinion expressly
disclaimed any intent to overrule South Carolina; it rested upon
the distinction between highways and railroads which justified
more extensive control by the states over the former.
It should not, all the same, be assumed from this that the
result reached in Bibb is necessarily undesirable. There is much
less reason for upholding state power here than in the tax cases.
Relying on South Carolina, the states have set up all-pervasive
systems of highway regulation that appear to be contrary to the
philosophy behind the commerce clause. It is paradoxical that, in
a country dominated by the free-trade concept of the commerce
clause, interstate commerce by motor must obtain separate permits, conform to conflicting rules, and pay toll every time it crosses
a new state line. It is to be hoped that Bibb indicates that the
98 359 U.S. 520 at 529 (1959).
99 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
100 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 at 783 (1945).
101 See cases cited in SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT 211-212
102 359 U.S. 520 at 528 (1959).

(1957).
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Court will henceforth regard such state obstructions to motor
commerce with the same jealous eye that it turns to state clogs upon
railroad mobility.
One who examines the commerce decisions of the past term
is bound to conclude that they illustrate a tendency-unfortunately
not too infrequent in the present Court-to support even correct
decisions with inadequate reasoning and analysis. In its Northwest States Cement opinion, the Court animadverted on the "need
for clearing up the tangled underbrush of past cases" in this field,
asserting that "the decisions have been 'not always clear ... consistent or reconcilable.' " 103 Unfortunately, the decisions discussed
on commerce and state power appear only to compound the confusion. Although, as pointed out, the results in each of these cases
can be justified, the analysis in the Court's opinions can hardly
serve to clarify. The desire to appear consistent with precedent
may be understandable in a tribunal constantly censured with having relegated stare decisis to constitutional limbo. Still, it hardly
justifies the twisting of clear prior decisions to make them appear
to mean something other than what they have always meant to the
profession. To treat stare decisis as an exercise in extreme procrusteanism is scarcely the way to meet men's reasonable expectations
for certainty in the law. Where new ground is clearly broken by
decisions such as those discussed, it hardly helps for the Court
to act as though it were only treading on old ground.104

v.

CRIMINAL CASES

Among the most important aspects of the high Court's role
as the arbiter of federalism is its function in reviewing state criminal convictions. This function has come to be exercised with increasing frequency in recent years. Indeed, so common has judicial
intervention from Washington in the criminal sphere become that
it has led some to assert that the Supreme Court has assumed the
position of a virtual court of criminal appeal from the state courts.
But this misconceives the actual function of the high bench
in this area. The Court may be the hierarchical head of the federal
judicial system. The same is clearly not true of its relationship
to the state courts. The framers never intended to compound the
American legal system into one common judicial mass.105 The
10S 358 U.S. 450 at 457-458
1~ Compare Frankfurter,

(1959).

J., in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,

358 U.S. 450 at 473 (1959).
105 Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 403 (1819).
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Court stated early in 1959: "Some recent suggestions that the
Constitution was in reality a deft device for establishing a centralized government are not only without factual justification but
fly in the face of history. It has more accurately been shown that
the men who wrote the Constitution as well as the citizens of the
member States of the Confederation were fearful of the power of
centralized government and sought to limit its power."106 In the
judicial sphere, the organic instrument was not intended to reduce the state courts to subordinates of one central tribunal, with
the latter exercising full appellate authority over all state decisions.
On the contrary, the power of the highest Court to undo convictions in the state courts is limited to enforcement of those rights
secured by the Constitution.
What this means as a practical matter in specific cases is a
'more difficult question. The Fourteenth Amendment, without
any doubt, imposed upon the Court some responsibility over the
caliber of criminal justice dispensed in the states. But how much
responsibility was the Court supposed to assume? Or, to put it
in the more specific context in which it has arisen, did the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose upon the
criminal law of the states all the restrictions contained in the Bill
of Rights or did it require something less?
If any question has been answered consistently by the Supreme Court, it has been this one. "We have held from the beginning and uniformly that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the States any of the provisions of the first eight amendments as such."107 It is true that
a contrary view has been urged in the present Court by Justices
Black and Douglas.108 But even they have conceded that theirs
has not been "the prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amendment."109
,
Though the law on ·the subject thus appears clearly settled,
the. Court during the past term found it necessary to reiterate in
detail its holdings in the matter. Accoi:ding to its opinion in
Bartkus v. Illinois,11° it is established "conclusively that Congress
and the members of the Legislatures of the ratifying St~tes did
not contemplate that the Fourteenth Amendment was a short106 Bartkus v. Illinois,
101 Id. at 124.

359 U.S. 121 at 137 (1959).

108 See cases cited, id. at 151, n. 1.
109 Dissenting, id. at 150.
110 359

U.S. 121 (1959).
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hand incorporation of the first eight amendments making them
applicable as explicit restrictions· upon the States."111
Nor did the Court satisfy itself in Bartkus with simple reiteration of established doctrine. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
contains a detailed analysis and table of the specific provisions
which correspond to the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments
in the constitutions of the states which ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as of those states entering the Union after such
ratification. These, Justice Frankfurter shows, indicate beyond
any doubt the soundness of the Court's consistent decisions on
the subject. "Surely this compels the conclusion that Congress
and the States have always believed that the Due Process Clause
brought into play a basis of restrictions upon the States other
than the undisclosed incorporation of the original eight amendments."112
At first glance, the exhaustive Frankfurter ,effort-based as it
was on intensive scholarly research into the constitutions of almost
all the states-appears to have as its purpose only the superfluous
hammering of additional nails into the coffin of dead constitutional doctrine. It should nevertheless be noted that the view
rejected once again in Bartkus has displayed amazing persistence
for doctrine that has never commanded the adherence of a majority of the Court. Even after it had been rejected for over
half a century, it was still able to receive the concurrence of four
justices in 1944.11 3 More recently, it has been advocated only by
Justices Black and Douglas. Since 1957, however, the Black-Douglas wing of the Court has come close to constituting a majority.11 4
Justice Frankfurter may have deemed it necessary to reaffirm the
established doctrine in order to anticipate a renewed effort by
Justices Black and Douglas to win over a majority. From this
point of view, his detailed analysis of state constitutions could
strongly buttress the majority holding, thus making it less likely
that the minority approach would be adhered to by other than the
three justices who dissented in Bartkus.11 5
Bartkus itself involved a problem that is inherent in the very
111 Id. at

112 Id.

124.

at 126.
llSAdamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 68 (1944).
114 During the 1957 term, Justices Douglas and Black again asserted their view on the
matter in dissent. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 at 477, 480 (1958). Chief Justice
Warren also dissented there.
·
115 It should be noted particularly that Justice Brennan, who has often joined with
the Black-Douglas-Warren wing of the Court, concurred in the Bartkus opinion. He had
abstained in the Hoag case.
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n~ture of our federalism. In our system, unlike that which prevails in many others, both the nation and the states are provided
with the complete accoutrements of government; each is composed of fully developed legislative, executive, and judicial
branches. In such a system, an individual may commit an act
which constitutes a crime under the laws of both jurisdictions.
If such a case arises, can he be tried, convicted, and sentenced in
both a federal and state court? Or, if acquitted in one, can he be
tried again in the other on the same facts?
Petitioner in Bartkus was tried in 1953 in a federal court
for robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association
located in Illinois. The case was tried to a jury and resulted in
an acquittal. In 1954, an Illinois grand jury indicted petitioner.
The facts recited in the Illinois indictment were substantially
identical to those contained in the prior federal indictment. The
Illinois indictment charged that these facts constituted a violation of the Illinois robbery statute. Petitioner was tried and convicted in the Illinois court and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner's plea of autrefois acquit was rejected by the
Illinois courts. Before the Supreme Court, he contended that his
state conviction after a federal acquittal violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
What is the test to determine whether due process has been
violated in such a case? The Bartkus opinion restates that which
had been developed in the cases rejecting the view that due process
in the Fourteenth Amendment includes all of the specific rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Quoting Justice Cardozo in a
leading case,11 6 Justice Frankfurter states, "About the meaning
of due process, in broad perspective unrelated to the first eight
amendments, he suggested that it prohibited to the States only
those practices 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.' " 117 In
other words, it is not enough, under the Court's test, that there
has been only a violation of a specific provision of the Bill of
Rights; the state practice at issue must be one which the highest
Court finds repulsive. Due process in the Fourteenth Amendment
thus bars procedures which shock "the conscience of society ascertained as best it may be by a tribunal disciplined for the task and
environed by the best safeguards for disinterestedness and detachment.''118
116 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 323 (1937). Like Bartkus, it also involved a
claim of double jeopardy. ·
111 359 U.S. 121 at 127 (1959).
118 Id. at 128.
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The present writer's analysis last year of Hoag v. New Jersey 119
would indicate that, to him at least, multiple prosecutions against
one individual growing out of the same fact pattern shock one's
sense of justice. The Bartkus Court would, however, assert that
one's personal notions of justice should not be controlling here.
"Time," says Justice Frankfurter, "has not lessened the concern
of the Founders in devising a federal system which would likewise
be a safeguard against arbitrary government. The greatest selfrestraint is necessary when that federal system yields results with
which a court is in little sympathy."120
To the Court, the fulcrum of decision in Bartkus is the caution
which the Constitution imposes upon the high bench in reviewing the decisions of coordinate judicial tribunals, wholly independent in their own sphere. It must be remembered that the question of double jeopardy presented in the Bartkus type of case is
one that has arisen before. "Constitutional challenge to successive state and federal prosecutions based upon the same transaction or conduct is not a new question before the Court. . . .
The Fifth Amendment's proscription of double jeopardy has been
invoked and rejected in over twenty cases of real or hypothetical
successive state and federal prosecution cases before this Court."121
The 1922 Lanza case122 squarely held valid a federal prosecution
arising out of the same facts which had been the basis of a prior
state conviction.
In Abbate v. United States123 -a companion case to Bartkusthe Court was asked to overrule Lanza. Petitioners there were
convicted in an Illinois court of conspiracy to blow up certain
property. After receiving prison sentences in Illinois, they were
indicted and convicted of the same conspiracy in a federal district
court and again sentenced to prison. The Court, however, refused
to overrule the 1922 decision. "No considerations or persuasive
reasons not presented to the Court in the prior cases are advanced
why we should depart from its firmly established principle. On the
contrary, undesirable consequences would follow if Lanza were
overruled. " 124
If Lanza is still the rule and a subsequent federal prosecution
119 356 U.S. 464- (1958). See Schwartz, "The Supreme Court-October 1957 Term," 57
MICH. L. REv. 315 at 339 (1959).
120 359 U.S. 121 at 137-138 (1959).
121 Id. at 128-129.
122United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
123 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
124 Id. at 195.
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is not.barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, it would hardly make sense to hold that a subsequent state
prosecution is so shocking as to contravene due process. This is
the real basis for the Bartkus decision.
The limitations involved in the Court's review of state convictions on due process grounds also explain the decision in Frank
v. Maryland.12r. Appellant there was convicted for violating a
provision of the Baltimore City Code which made it an offense
to refuse admission to a house to a health inspector who sought
entry to investigate sanitary conditions. In the instant case, an
inspector requested entry to appellant's house, stating that he had
evidence of rodent infestation there. Appellant refused. His arrest
and conviction followed, although it was not disputed that at no
time did the inspector have a warrant authorizing him to enter.
The Supreme Court, by a bare majority, affirmed appellant's
conviction. On the surface, the decision in this respect appears
contrary·to District of Columbia v. Little,12 6 where the Court had
held that a refusal to admit a health inspector without a warrant
did not justify a conviction for violating a regulation prohibiting
interfering with an inspector in the performance of his duties. It
is true that the Court there expressly disclaimed decision on the
question of whether municipalities could constitutionally provide for health inspections without warrants. Yet the Little case
has generally been assumed to answer that question, at least by
implication, in the negative.127
Little, nevertheless, involved a federal conviction. Under the
Court's interpretation of due process, as already emphasized, control over state convictions does not proceed upon the same basis
as does control over federal ones. Where a state conviction is
at issue, it is not. enough for reversal that a similar federal conviction would fall as contrary to a specific guaranty in the Bill of
Rights. In such a case, more is required: only if the state conviction was secured by methods which are so extreme as to be shocking must it be reversed.
Under the leading case of Wolf v. Colorado,12 8 the Fourteenth
Amendment does not impose upon the states the federal rule requiring the reversal of federal convictions based upon evidence
secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Frank follows

.s.

12r. 359 U
360 (1959).
126 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
127 If Little's constitutional

objection was clearly invalid, how could it be said he was
not "interfering" within the meaning of the relevant regulation?
12s 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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a similar approach. Though, under Little, entry by a federal inspector without a warrant may contravene the Fourth Amendment, that alone does not require reversal of the Frank conviction.
The Court in Frank was strongly influenced by the fact that
the procedure of health inspection without a warrant is one that
has existed for over a century and a half. "The power here challenged rests . . . on a long history of its exercise. " 129 This has
been true not only in Baltimore (the city where Frank arose);
it has been the uniform practice of agencies of local government
to provide for similar inspections in connection with sanitation,
plumbing, building, and the like.130 To be sure, due process issues
are not to be decided alone by a Gallup poll of governmental
practice. At the same time, the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
did not "destroy history for the States."131 Where what is at issue
in a case is a "time-honored procedure"132 which is generally followed in other states, that is bound to be of great weight in determining whether fundamental notions of justice are being violated. In Justice Frankfurter's words in Frank, "what free people
have found consistent with their enjoyment of freedom for centuries is hardly to be deemed to violate due process...." 133 This is
particularly true when the conditions calling forth the state power
at issue have, if anything, been constantly growing in intensity.
"There is a total want of important modification in the circumstances or the structure of society which calls for a disregard of so
much history. On the contrary, the problems which gave rise
to these ordinances have multiplied manifold, as have the difficulties of enforcement."134
This is not to say, to be sure, that due process must necessarily
imprison criminal procedure in an eighteenth-century strait jacket.
It is, on the contrary, a plastic concept which, in appropriate cases,
does enable "a free society to advance in its standards of what is
deemed reasonable and right."1311 The type of case in which due
process can expand to meet changing conceptions of the essentials
of justice was strikingly illustrated in the Court's 1956 Griffin
129 359 U.S. 360 at 371 (1959).
130 See District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 at 3 (1950).
131 Holmes, J., in Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22 at 31 (1922).
132 359 U.S. 360 at 370 (1959).
183 Id. at 371.
184 Ibid. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959), in

which probable
jurisdiction was noted in a case presenting substantially the same facts and issues as Frank
v. Maryland.
1811 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 at 27 (1949), quoted in 360 U.S. 360 at 371 (1959).
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decision,13 6 where it was held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment for a state to deny to defendants alleging poverty free transcripts of the trial proceedings, which would enable them adequately to appeal from their convictions. The right to such a free
transcript may be a relatively recent one in our law. But a rule
whose effect is to deny the poor an adequate appellate review is
today an utter misfit in a country dedicated to equality of justice.
Burns v. Ohio137 involved an application of the Griffin holding. The question presented there was whether a state may constitutionally require that an indigent defendant in a criminal case
pay a filing fee before permitting him to file a motion for leave to
appeal in one of its courts. This question seems even easier to
decide than that in Griffin, for "At least in Griffin, the defendant
might have raised to the Supreme Court any claims that he had
that were apparent on the bare record, though trial errors could
not be raised. Here, the action of the State has completely barred
the petitioner from obtaining any review at all in the Supreme
Court of Ohio."138 Ohio urged, however, that Griffin should not
apply because appeal to its Supreme Court was a matter, not of
right, but of discretion. In the Court's view, "this argument misses
the crucial significance of Griffin.''139 Under the Griffin approach
to due process, indigents must be given the "same opportunities
to invoke the discretion of the Supreme Court of Ohio"140 which
they would have if they had adequate financial resources. This
they do not have, since, under the Ohio practice, without paying
the filing fee, they cannot at all have the Ohio court consider on
the merits their applications for leave to appeal. As the Chief
Justice puts it, "The imposition by the State of financial barriers
restricting the availability of appellate review for indigent criminal defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice
Under Law."141
Among the common cases which require the Court to apply its
concept of criminal due process are those arising out of denials of
counsel and the use of allegedly coerced confessions. The principles to govern decision of the due-process question in such cases
are those laid down in the Betts142 and Ashcraft143 cases. In the
186 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
137 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
138 Id. at 258.
139 Id. at 257.
140 Id. at 258.
141Ibid.
142 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
148 Ashcraft·v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 ·(1944).
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present Court, however, it seems apparent that there is a willingness to apply such principles in a manner favorable to defendants.144 Thus, in Cash v. Culver,1 45 the denial of counsel was held
improper "because of the complexity of the proceedings.''146 The
conviction was based on accomplice evidence and, says the Court,
a layman would hardly be familiar with his rights under the state's
law to impeach such evidence. There were also questions with
regard to the admissibility of evidence and impeachment of prosecution witnesses which raised problems "beyond the ken of a layman. " 147 One wonders, nevertheless, whether the same type of
thing cannot be said in almost any case where an accused is not
accorded the assistance of counsel. Without the guiding hand of
counsel, even the educated and intelligent layman is under disadvantages comparable to those emphasized by the Court in Cash.
To look at a criminal trial the way the Cash opinion does is to go
far toward holding that almost every denial of counsel violates the
"fair trial" test laid down in the Betts decision.148
In the 1944 Ashcraft case,1 49 the Court had held that, where the
accused had been held incommunicado for thirty-six hours, during which time, without sleep or rest, he had been interrogated by
relays of police officers, the situation was "so inherently coercive"
as to vitiate any confession secured under such circumstances. In
Spano v. New Y ork,1 50 defendant was questioned for eight straight
hours, starting in early evening after defendant had surrendered
himself to the authorities. Here, too, the Court held that the confession was invalid. "We conclude that petitioner's will was overborn by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused,
after considering all the facts. " 151 The facts here should be compared with those in the I 953 Stein case,15 2 where confessions made
during an illegal detention of thirty-two hours, during twelve hours
of which defendants were closely questi!)ned, were held not barred
by due process.
To those who looked upon Stein as an unwarranted watering
144 But see Anonymous No. 6 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959), where the holding of
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), was applied.
145 358 U.S. 633 (1959).
146 Id. at 637.
147 Id. at 638.
l48Note 142 supra.
14_9 Note 143 supra.
150 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
151 Id. at 323.
152 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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down of Ashcraft,1 53 Spano will represent a wel_come swing of the
judicial pendulum. Indeed, Spano may indicate that the Court
now is ready to go even farther than its bare holding would indicate. According to the opinion by the Chief Justice there, "The
abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not
turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on
the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while
enforcing the law."154 But, whenever a confession is made during
a period of illegal detention, it is based upon police disobedience
of the law. Does this mean then that a state confession made during
illegal detention is barred by due process? If it does, the basic
distinction between federal and state convictions in this respect
may be on the way to being erased by the present Court.155
VI.

JENCKS AND THE JENCKS STATUTE156

One of the most significant cases in recent years, from the point
of view of the rights of criminal defendants, was Jencks v. United
States.151 In it, the high tribunal added a new dimension of evidentiary fair play to federal criminal procedure.158 In Jencks, the
Court laid down a broad rule on the right of a defendant to disclosure of documents in the government's possession. According
to the Court last term, in pithily expressing the effect of the Jencks
holding, it decided "that the defense in a federal criminal prosecution was entitled, under certain circumstances, to obtain, for impeachment purposes, statements which had been made to government agents by government witnesses. These statements were
therefore to be turned over to the defense at the time of crossexamination if their contents related to the subject matter of the
witness' direct testimony, and if a demand had been made for
specific statements which had been written by the witness or, if
orally made, as recorded by agents of the Government. We also
held that the trial judge was not to examine the statements to
determine if they contained material inconsistent with the testimony of the witness before deciding whether he would turn them
over to the defense. Once the statements had been shown to con153 See SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT

154 360

182 (1957).

U.S. 315 at 320 1959).

180-181 (1957).
assessing the present writer's remarks in this section, it should be borne in mind
that he has been of counsel in a pending case involving the Jencks problem in an administrative agency.
157 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
l58See comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1409 (1959).
155 See SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT

156 In
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tain related material only the defense was adequately equipped
to decide whether they had value for impeachment."159
Jencks, as is well known, was one of the most controversial of
recent Supreme Court decisions. "The decision," the Court itself
has conceded, "promptly gave rise to sharp controversy and concern."160 Jencks was decided on June 3, 1957. The very next day
a bill was introduced in the Congress to deal with what was said
to be the "serious problem" posed by it. On September 2, 1957,
the criminal code was amended by adding a new section to govern
statements and reports of witnesses in criminal proceedings.161
What is the effect of this so-called Jencks statute on the rule
enunciated by the Supreme Court? In the first place, there is the
question of the constitutional power of the Congress to enact the
statute. That question was answered in the affirmative in Palermo
v. United States.162 It holds that, since its enactment, it is the
Jencks statute, not the Supreme Court decision, that governs the
production of statements of government witnesses for a defendant's
inspection at a criminal trial. Jencks, says the opinion in Palermo,
was an exercise of the Court's "power, in the absence of statutory
provision, to prescribe procedures for the administration of justice
in the federal courts."163 But the judicial rule here must give way
after "Congress had determined to exercise its power to define the
rules that should govern in this particular area in the trial of
criminal cases instead of leaving the matter to the lawmaking of the
courts."164 In view of the congressional power, exercised "from the
earliest days," to prescribe rules of procedure in the federal courts,
the Jencks statute, Palermo holds, "does not reach any constitutional barrier."165
The Palermo holding on the constitutional question appears
sound. What is more debatable is the implication in the opinion
of peremptory power in the Congress over the rule enunciated in
Jencks. It is important to note that the Jencks statute enactment
itself was by no means an assertion of such extreme legislative
authority. On the contrary, as Justice Brennan (himself the author
of the Jencks opinion) points out, "Congress had no thought to
invade the traditional discretion of trial judges in evidentiary matters beyond checking extravagant interpretations of our decision in
159 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 at 345-346
!160 Id. at 346.
161 18 u.s.c. (1958) §3500.
102 360 U.S. l!43 (1959).
163 Id.
164 Id.

at 345.
at 347-348.
165Id. at 353, n. 11.

(1959).
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Jencks
., which were said to have been made by some· lower
courts. Indeed Congress took particular pains to make it clear that
the legislation 'reaffirms' that decision's holding."166 What the
Jencks statute does is to specify what documents a defendant is
entitled to, as well as the procedural mechanics involved in securing their production. It, in other words, preserves the underlying
rights, if not the identical procedures, dictated by J encks.161
If the Congress had sought to abrogate the ] encks rule, an entirely different question would have been presented. In such a
case, what Justice Brennan terms "an obvious constitutional problem"168 would exist. It should be emphasized that, in Jencks itself,
the Court spoke in the broadest terms. The opinion there redounds in the broad language of "justice." By its holding, the
Court was articulating a fundamental requirement of fair procedure. While it is thus, to quote Justice Brennan again, "true that
our holding in Jencks was not put on constitutional grounds, for it
did not have to be; . . . it would be idle to say that the commands
of the Constitution were not close to the surface of the decision."169
The constitutional overtones in I encks indicate that there would be
grave doubt about the power of Congress itself to do violence to
what the Court held to be a fundamental principle of "justice."
"Less substantial restrictions than this of the common-law rights
of confrontation of one's accusers have been struck down by this
Court under the Sixth Amendment."170
During last term, the Court dealt with several questions not
specifically answered by I encks and the I encks statute. In Pitts.:
bur:gh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,17 1 the Court rejected a claim
that ] encks required the government to permit defendants to inspect the grand jury minutes covering the testimony before that
body of a key government witness at the trial. ] encks, said a bare
majority of the Court, "is in nowise controlling here. It had
nothing to do with grand jury proceedings and its language was
not intended to encompass grand jury minutes."172 In the Court's
view, the policy behind the historic secrecy of grand jury proceedings outweighs the interest of defendant in disclosure. Hence, the
lifting of secrecy here is not essential to the fair administration of
criminal justice within the sense of the I encks holding.

166 Concurring,

id. at 361.
comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674 at 686 (1958).
168 Concurring, in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S.
169 Id. at 362·363.
110 Id. at 362.
171360 U .s. 395 (1959).
112 Id. at 398.
167 See

343 at 362 (1959).
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In the already-referred-to Palermo case,173 the Court dealt with
the question of the types of document to which a defendant is
entitled under the Jencks statute. According to Palermo, the
statute now constitutes the exclusive vehicle whereby production
of statements of government witnesses may be made to the defense
in criminal cases. Consequently, only the documents included in
its language need be produced. What are these documents?
In Palermo itself, the document whose disclosure was sought
was a particular memorandum summarizing what a witness had
said during a conference with government agents, executed by one
of th.e agents present. The Court, five-to-four, held that, under
the statute, such document did not have to be produced. The
] encks statute expressly includes written statements made by
government witnesses. The document at issue was patently not
such a statement. But the statute does not limit the right to production to statements signed by witnesses themselves. Under it the
statements to which a defendant is entitled include, in addition:
"A stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of
an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the Government and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such
oral statement."174 According to Palermo, by this language, "the
statute was meant to encompass more than mere automatic reproductions of oral statements."175 The difficult question, of course,
is to determine how much more was meant to be included.
In the Court's view, "the legislation was designed to eliminate
the danger of distortion and misrepresentation inherent in a report
which merely selects portions, albeit accurately, from a lengthy
oral recital."176 Hence, it is not necessary to produce "summaries
of an oral statement which evidence substantial selection of material, or which were prepared after the interview without the aid
of complete notes, and hence rest on the memory of the agent."177
The memorandum of interview at issue in Palermo, according to
the Court, was just such a skeleton version of what had actually
transpired.
It may well be that, on its facts, Palermo is correct in its holding
on this point. At the same time, it would be most unfortunate if
Palermo were to be used as the starting point for an unduly restric178 Note 162 supra.
17418 U.S.C. (1958) §3500 (e)(2).
171i 360 U.S. 343 at 352 (1959).
176lbid.

177 Id. at 352-353.
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tive interpretation of the rights of defendants. In the eloquent
words of Justice Brennan's opinion, "it would do violence to the
understanding on which Congress, working at high speed under
the pressures of the end of a session, passed the statute, if we were to
sanction applications of it exalting and exaggerating its restrictions,
in disregard of the congressional aim of reaffirming the basic
Jencks principle of assuring the defendant a fair opportunity to
make his defense."178
If the future cases lose sight of this, they will open the door to
constant efforts by law enforcement officers to defeat the spirit of
Jencks. "There inheres in an overrigid interpretation and application of the statute the hazard of encouraging a practice of government agents' taking statements in a fashion calculated to insulate
them from production."179 Under some of the language in
Palermo, such insulation is all too easy from the government's point
of view.
An obvious question that arises to one familiar with the high
Court's role in the criminal field is that of the effect of Jencks and
the Jencks statute on state convictions. Jencks itself, we have seen,
has clear constitutional implications. Violation of its rule, in
Justice Brennan's phrase in Palermo, raises "a serious question of
potential invasion of Sixth Amendment rights. " 180 Yet, as emphasized in the prior section of this article, a state conviction will not
be reversed only because such federal right would be violated, if
the conviction were a federal one. The test, where the criminal
case is a state one, is whether due process is violated and such violation occurs only if the right violated is so fundamental that it is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."181 Is the right of defendant under Jencks such a right? The broad basis upon which
the holding in Jencks was based would seem to point to an affirmative answer. The Jencks opinion itself, ~fter enunciating its rule,
asserts, "Justice requires no less."182 If that is true, Jencks is more
than a rule governing only federal trials. By articulating Jencks in
terms of a fundamental of justice,183 the Court foreshadowed its
inclusion in the due process upon which its control of state criminal
proceedings is based.
·
178 Id. at 365.
179 Id. at 365-366.
180 Id. at 363.
181 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 325
1s2 353 U.S. 657 at 669 (1957).
183 Compare comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1409 at

(1937).
1415 (1959).
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FIRST AMENDMENT CASES

In protesting against the decision of the Court in one case last
term, Justice Black asserted, "the Court once again retreats from
what I conceive to be its highest duty, that of maintaining unimpaired the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights."184 To Justice Black, there is
little doubt that the priniary function of the high bench is to vindicate the personal rights of the individual as against the State. Such
rights, in his view, were intended to have a preferred position in our
constitutional scheme.
The "preferred position" theory in this respect has been urged
with especial force with regard to those rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment. That amendment, declared Justice Black, dissenting in the already-discussed Barenblatt case,185 "says in no
equivocal language that Congress shall pass no' law abridging
freedom of speech, press, assembly or petition."186 Proceeding
from this absolute language, Justice Black goes on to take an
absolutist position with regard to First Amendment rights. He
concedes that, in other cases, congressional action is to be upheld
if it is based upon a reasonable balancing of the interests involved.
But, he affirms in his Barenblatt dissent, "I do not agree that laws
directly abridging First Amendment freedoms can be justified
by a congressional or judicial balancing process."187
In Barenblatt itself, as our previous discussion of it indicated,
what was at issue was a congressional investigation into un-American
activities. The particular hearing was one on Communist infiltration into the field of education. Petitioner, a college teacher, was
asked about Communist activities and affiliations while he had
been a graduate student. He urged that such inquiries transgressed·
the First Amendment. The Court, in rejecting his contention, was
clearly acting contrary to the preferred-position theory. In its view,
"Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental
interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by
the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in
the particular circumstances shown."188 In a case like this, "the
close nexus between the Communist Party and violent overthrow
184. Dissenting in Anonymous No.
185 Note 18 supra.
186 360 U.S. 109 at 140 (1959).
187 Id. at 141.

188 Id.

at 126.

6 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 at 299-300 (1959).
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of government"189 is found to justify this congressional inquiry
into an area covered by the First Amendment.
Nor is the legislative authority in such a case defeated because
its investigation was one into the field of education. There was
language in the Court's 1957 Sweezy opinion190 which appeared to
immunize education from all legislative inquiry. In Barenblatt,
the Court repudiates such broad implication: "We think that investigatory power in this domain is not to be denied Congress solely
because the field of education is involved. Nothing in the prevailing opinions in Sweezy . . . stands for a contrary view."191
The Barenblatt clarification in this respect seems most salutary.
The claims of academic freedom hardly justify the wholesale prohibition of inquiries into Communist activity in the field of education. Barenblatt holds specifically that the Constitution is no bar
against action by the Congress "inquiring into the extent to which
the Communist Party has succeeded in infiltrating into our universities, or elsewhere, persons and groups committed to furthering
the objective of overthrow."192
It has been asserted that the preferred-position theory is really
an "old theory."193 At the same time, it is clear that its importance
today dates from about two decades ago, starting with the famous
footnote of Justice Stone in the Carolene Products case.194 From
about 1943 to 19_48, the preferred-position philosophy was actually
accepted by a majority of the Court.195 From 1949 on, however,
the Court receded from that position. Under the Vinson Court, in
fact, only Justices Black and Douglas remained to adhere to the
doctrine of firstness of the First Amendment.
Barenblatt is significant because it clearly demonstrates that,
in the present Court also, a definite majority rejects the preferredposition theory. It is true that the· Chief Justice joined Justice
Douglas in the advocacy of that theory contained in Justice Black's
dissent. Of even more significance, however, is the refusal of more
than three members of the Court to adhere to the theory. Justice
Brennan, often found with the Black-Douglas-Warren wing> was
careful to dissent on separate grounds and thus to dissociate himself from concurrence in the Black advocacy of the preferred-position approach.
1so Id. at 128.
100 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). See especially p. 251.
191360 U.S. 109 ·at 129. (1959).
.
192Ibid.
193 See Cahn, in 1958 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN I.Aw 699 (1959). ·
194 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152, n. 4 (-1938).
195 See SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME CoURT 235 (1957).
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An important question arising under the First Amendment is
that of the types of speech safeguarded by the constitutional
guaranty. In 1957 the Court expressly recognized that obscene
speech stands outside the pale of First Amendment protection.196
Is the same true of speech whose primary purpose is private profit?
In a 1942 case,19 7 the Court held that the protection of the First
Amendment did not extend to business advertisements. According to Justice Douglas last term, this ruling "has not survived reflection. " 198 The First Amendment, he said, is not at all restricted
to cultural ends. A protest against government action that affects
business interests also comes within the amendment. In the
Douglas view, "The profit motive should make no difference, for
that is an element inherent in the very conception of a press under
our system of free enterprise. Those who make their living through
exercise of First Amendment rights are no less entitled to its protection than those whose advocacy or promotion is not hitched to a
profit motive."199 And, if that is true, it is "difficult to draw a line
between that group and those who in other lines of endeavor advertise their wares by different means."200
Perhaps the best cases to illustrate the soundness of the view
that the existence of a First Amendment right does not depend
upon the absence of a profit motive are those involving censorship
of motion pictures. In 1915, the Court refused to hold movies
within the constitutional guaranty, on. the ground that they were
"a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for
profit."201 In the 1952 Burstyn case,202 on the other hand, the
Court declared that this was irrelevant to the First Amendment
issue, and held that motion pictures were within the ambit of protection accorded by the amendment.
During the past term, the Court was once again required to consider the impact of a motion picture censorship law upon First
Amendment rights. In Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the University of the State of New York,203 the statute
at issue required a license for the distribution or exhibition of
any motion picture. No license was to issue if a film was found by
196 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Justices Douglas and Black, it should
be noted, dissented even here, for their absolutist position does not permit such a holding.
197Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
198 Concurring in Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 at 514 (1959).
199 Ibid.
200Ibid.
201 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230 at 244 (1915).
202 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
203 360 U.S. 684 (1959). See note, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 134 (1959).
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the licensing agency to be "immoral" or "of such a character that
its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals." These terms were
further defined as denoting a motion picture "the dominant purpose or effect of which is erotic or pornographic; or which portrays
acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or lewdness, or which expressly or impliedly presents such acts as desirable, acceptable or
proper patterns of behavior."
At issue in Kingsley was the denial of a license for the film
"Lady Chatterley's Lover." Such denial was based on the broad
ground that "the whole theme of this motion picture is immoral
under said law, for that theme is the presentation of ad1.:1ltery as
a desirable, acceptable and proper pattern of behavior."204 The
question for the Court was whether the state could deny a license to
a motion picture because, in the words of the New York court,
"its subject matter is adultery presented as being right and desirable
for certain people under certain circumstances." 205 To put it in another way, could New York deny a license to any film which approvingly portrays an adulterous relationship, quite without reference
to the manner of its portrayal?
The opinion of the Court, by Justice Stewart, answered this
question in the negative: "What New York has done . . . is to
prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture
advocates an idea - that adultery under certain circumstances may
be proper behavior. Yet the First Amendment's basic guarantee
is of freedom to advocate ideas. The State, quite simply, has thus
struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty."206
In view of the interpretation of the New York statute by the
highest court of that state, it is hard to see how the high tribunal
could have decided otherwise.207 The New York court construed
the law as giving to the term "sexual immorality" a concept entirely
different from the concept embraced in words like "obscenity" or
"pornography." The film at issue, in fact, was expressly found
below not to be obscene or one whic;:h would operate itself as an
incitement to illegal action. Yet that made no difference under the
New York court's interpretation. The inflexible command which
it attributed to the state legislature was to outlaw any approving
204 360

U.S. 684 at 685 (1959).

205 Id. at 687-688.
206 Id. at 688. Four justices
201 But see the concurring

concurred in the opinion of the Court.
opinion of Justice Harlan, id. at 702, joined by Justices
Frankfurter and Whittaker, interpreting the statute as requiring obscene content or incitement to unlawful conduct. With this interpretation the statute was said to be constitutional on its face, but unconstitutionally applied tp the film in question. The ramifications of this concurring opinion are discussed in note, 58 MICH. L. REv. 134 (1959).
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portrayal of an adulterous relationship. This is, in effect, to bar
mere advocacy of conduct contrary to most people's moral standards. But the Constitution clearly protects advocacy alone - i.e.,
where it falls short of incitement. "Its guarantee is not confined
to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a
majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may
sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the
single tax. " 208
The interpretation below enabled the Court to avoid the far
more difficult question which has been inherent in all of the movie
censorship cases presented to it - namely, that of whether any prior
censorship of motion pictures is consistent with the Constitution.
Justices Douglas and Black have adhered to the view that all such
censorship is invalid. In their view, as again expressed in their
concurring opinion in Kingsley, "censorship of movies is unconstitutional, since it is a form of 'previous restraint' that is as much at
war with the First Amendment, made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth, as the censorship struck down in Near v.
State of Minnesota . . . . I can find in the First Amendment no
room for any censor whether he is scanning an editorial, reading a
news broadcast, editing a novel or a play, or previewing a
movie." 209
Although there is much to be said for this point of view in a
system which has, since Blackstone, abhorred any prior restraint of
organs of public opinion, it is probable that the majority of the
Court would not go so far. To most of the justices, motion pictures
would appear to be comparable to speech in a street or public
place which is subject to regulation under properly drawn statutes.
A Court which held only three years ago that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press"210 would
hardly be likely to prohibit to the states all authority to deal with
obscenity in films.
VIII.

THE COURT AS AN INSTITUTION

Analysis of the highest tribunal's decisions during a given term
may enable one to acquire a picture of the different aspects of our
public law as they are unfolded. Even more important, however,
is the fact that such analysis permits a broader view of the working
208 360 U.S. 684 at 689 (1959).
209 Id. at 697. Near v. Minnesota,

283 U.S. 697 (1931), is the leading case on censorship
of newspapers.
,
210 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 485 (1957).
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of the Supreme Court as a governmental institution. From an institutional point of view, what do last term's decisions tell us about
the functioning of the high bench?
Perhaps the most significant thing to note about the Supreme
Court during the past year is an accentuation in the polarization
that has become its most striking characteristic. In the present
writer's article on the decisions of the 1957 term, the sharp
division in the Court as between the rival judicial philosophies of
Justices Frankfurter and Black was noted.211 During the 1958
term, the same split continued to dominate the work of the justices.
In all of the cases of note where there was a sharp split in the
Court,212 the exponents of the Frankfurter approach were to be
found on the one side, th,ose of the Black view on the other. Even
where the two schools were able to agree on the result in particular
cases, they all too frequently articulated their differences in
approach in separate concurrences.213
To be sure, internal fragmentation is nothing new ~n the
history of our highest tribunal. A splintered Supreme Court is,
indeed, but the juristic reflection of a pluralistic society, which has
as its basis acceptance of the fact that there is no single, simple
answer to the multifold problems which call for resolution by
governmental action. If the Court is sharply divided, it is because
the questi_ons presented to it call for anything but clear, ineluctable responses.
From the point of view of its over-all functioning, the significant thing to note about our high tribunal is the fact that, even
when it has presented a far from edifying spectacle of internal
atomization, it has continued to function as an institutional entity.
Even at such a time, the Court has continued to weave the basic
pattern of its jurisprudence. This has be.en true because, at any
given time, a particular approach to the judicial function receives
the adherence of five or more of the justices.
·
211 See Schwartz, "The Supreme Court-October 1957 Term," 57 MICH. L. REv. 315
at 347 (1959).
212 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72
(1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959);
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959). Compare Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), and Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959), where the split was not as clearly on the same doctrinal
grounds.
213 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535
(19,59); Kingsley J;ntemational Pictures v. Regents of the University of New York, 360 U.S.
684 (1959). It is not surprising, in view of this, that the number of dissents and concurrences during the term remained as high as ever.
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During the past term, a clear majority of the Court214 has indicated its acceptance of the Frankfurter, as opposed to the Black,
approach to the resolution of constitutional issues. In all of the key
decisions already discussed, a majority of the justices adhered to
the more restrained view of the judicial function which Justice
Frankfurter has advocated in his two decades on the bench. On
the other hand, the other four members of the Court215 do generally follow more or less what has come to be termed the "activist"
position. Yet, even here, the past term has seen what may foreshadow a weakening in that position. Thus, only Justices Black,
Douglas, and the Chief Justice adhered rigidly to the extreme
activist approach. In two significant cases, Barenblatt216 and
Bartkus,211 Justice Brennan was careful not to join the Black-Douglas position. On the key questions of whether First Amendment
rights are to be treated as having a preferred position and whether
the Bill of Rights guarantees are automatically included in the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Brennan thus indicated a tendency to swing over to the Frankfurter position.
Aside from the school segregation issue (where the Court was
bound to provoke the bitter reaction of an area whose very way of
life was uprooted by application of the relevant constitutional provision), the current controversy over the high tribunal stems largely
from its decisions rendered at the end of the 1956 term. Watkins,218
Sweezy, 219 Covert, 220 ]encks,221 Mallory,2 22 - these 1957 decisions
were seen by many to mark the end of a juristic era, comparable to
the change inaugurated twenty years earlier with the landmark
Jones and Laughlin decision.223 Between 1937 and 1957, the dominant theme in the Supreme Court had been its deference toward
the political branches. The 1957 decisions were taken by some
commentators to signal the end of the subdued role that had come
to characterize the Court in the post-1937 period.
Last term's decisions indicate that such an interpretation may
have been over-hasty. The principal decisions rendered during
1959 have the Frankfurter self-restraint approach as their dominant
214 Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart.
215 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan.
216 Note 18 supra.
217 Note llO supra.
218 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
219 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
220 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
221 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
222 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
223 NLRB v. Jones 8: Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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theme. More than that, they go far to correct some of the excesses
in several of the 1957 opinions which had disturbed many observers. Thus, Barenblatt,224 as already discussed, supplies a needed
corrective to the wholesale implications of Watkins;225 Uphaus2 26
does the same for Sweezy,2 27 as well as for the 1956 Nelson decision;228 and Palermo229 approves a legislative rectification of the
excesses implicit in Jencks.230 All in all, the 1958 term must appear
most satisfactory for those who have felt that the extreme activist
position does violence to the demands which society imposes upon
the judicial process.
There are, to be sure, those who deplore any decline in the
activist approach. To them, a judicial attitude of deference toward
the legislator leaves us unprotected against violations of constitutional right. This is, however, to ignore the basic limitations which
must obtain upon judicial power in a system such as ours. Judicial
review, no matter how we may gloss over it, is basically an un•
democratic institution. If the democratic bases of our system are to
be respected, the review power of the one non-democratic organ
of our government must be exercised with rigorous self-restraint.
Laws duly enacted by the people's representatives should not be
aborted by judicial fiat unless the judges are presented with no
other choice in the matter. The decisions of the 1958 term show
clearly that a majority of the justices today agree that proper deference toward the representatives of the people still remains the
judicial handmaiden of democracy.
U .s. 109 {1959).
U.S. 178 (1957).
U.S. 72 (1959).
U.S. 234 (1957).
228 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
229 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
230 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
224 360
226 354
226 360
227 354

